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Comments
AN EXAMINATION OF TRADITIONAL ARGUMENTS
ON REGULATION OF DOMESTIC AIR TRANSPORT
BRUCE KEPLINGER*
Economic regulation of private industry by independent national
commissions has been a part of the American way of life since the
1880's. Recently, the continuing discussion over the desirability
and effectiveness of this regulation has been intensified by presiden-
tial proposals to move toward economic deregulation of commercial
aviation.1 One such proposal is to deregulate the powers of the
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB),' which has regulated the domes-
tic airline industry since 1938.' The CAB was created as an ex-
periment to aid the growth of the infant commercial airline industry
emerging from the Depression of the 1930's." Government reg-
ulation was imposed on the airline industry because the market
forces of private industry were thought to hinder development of
commercial air transport. To eliminate or severely curtail this reg-
ulation is a radical step which should not be taken without careful
consideration of the reasons for CAB regulation.
This comment will demonstrate that past arguments made by
proponents of regulation do not support retention of the frame-
work in domestic air transport in the late 1970's. First, the grounds
for creating the CAB were spurious. Secondly, even if the founding
* I would like to thank Ned W. Graber for his preliminary research assistance
in the preparation of this comment.
1 In this paper the term "deregulation" refers to any program that removes
the government's economic controls over the airline industry, returning the in-
dustry to private economic forces. As will be seen, deregulation does not mean
abandoning safety regulations, antitrust laws, or any of the common law rules
against unfair competition.
2H.R. 10261, S. 2551, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). This bill would not end
all CAB regulation, but would place a greater emphasis on encouraging competi-
tion.
'The CAB was established by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601,
52 Stat. 973 (1938).
"Jones, The Anomaly of the Civil Aeronautics Board in American Govern-
ment, 20 J. AIR L. & COM. 140, 147 (1953).
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of the CAB were an appropriate response to the conditions of 1938,
when an infant industry was trying to develop under depressed
economic conditions, the present state of the airline industry dic-
tates that the justifications of 1938 are no longer applicable.' Since
World War II commercial air transport has developed into the
dominant source of transportation over long distance markets in
the United States.! In this dominant position, the airlines may no
longer require government protection.! Moreover, opponents of
regulation have asserted that regulation of commercial air transport
is today costing the American consumer several billion dollars
each year' in the administrative costs of satisfying the CAB reg-
ulations, the artificially high rates, and excessive service quality, and
if these assertions of economic waste are correct, prompt decisions
concerning the desirability of continued regulation are needed;
if past arguments do not support retention of the federal regulatory
framework, new justifications showing that regulation is needed
in the modem air transport industry should be presented for evalua-
tion. The future of air transport regulation must rest on the strength
of these contemporary arguments
I. BACKGROUND OF THE 1938 ACT
Although Congressional investigations of aviation began as early
Comment, Is Regulation Necessary? California Air Transportation and Na-
tional Regulatory Policy, 74 YALE L. J. 1416, 1430 (1965).
6 CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, THE DOMESTIC RouTE SYSTEM: ANALYSIS AND
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 122-34 (1974). This report projects continued growth
in the industry. Even during the period of 1968-1972, which was considered a
slump in airline growth, the growth rate was six percent per year. Id. at 123.
The proponents of regulation have pointed to this growth as proof of the
correctness of federal regulatory policies. Tipton & Gerwitz, The Effect of Regu-
lated Competition on the Air Transport Industry, 22 J. AIR L. & CoM. 157 (1955).
There is, however, no proof that the industry's growth is not more attributable to
the massive technological improvements that have occurred during the regulatory
period. Perhaps the growth would have been even more rapid and innovative
without federal regulation.
'Green and Nader, Economic Regulation vs. Competition: Uncle Sam the
Monopoly Man, 82 YALE L. J. 871 (1973). The estimate is that the cost was $2-4
billion in 1972. Id. at 882. In 1975 the minimum estimate was one billion dollars
per year. Hearings on Oversight of CAB Practices and Procedures Before the Sub-
comm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., vol. 2, at 1153 (1975) [hereinafter referred to as
Kennedy Hearings, 1975].
'The contemporary arguments are presented in 41 J. AIR L. & COM. Vol. 4
(1975).
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as 1918, the first comprehensive legislation on the subject did not
appear for twenty years.'0 The inital interest in air transport was
in the field of mail delivery. In 1925 Congress began subsidizing
air commerce by paying airlines more than the cost of carrying the
mail.1' In 1930 the major mail route holders conducted a series
of collusive meetings" in which the lucrative routes were divided
among those present. Because these meetings were inconsistent with
the Congressional goal of maintaining competition, when the
abuses were discovered in 1934, the routes were taken from the
carriers and the Army was charged with carrying air mail. Poor
equipment and a lack of planning led to the deaths of twelve Army
pilots 3 which shocked the public and prompted the passage of the
Air Mail Act of 1934" which put commercial air transport on a
competitive bidding basis and imposed safety regulations upon the
carriers." The plan failed because the competitive bidding mechan-
ism allowed the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to revise
the rates annually,"6 permitting airlines to make ridiculously low
bids for the first year and then recoup their losses in later years
when the ICC adjusted the rates.'
Even though the administrative burden of this plan was large,
the government had not yet developed a complete system of route
regulation. Under the 1934 Act carriers could begin making "off-
the-route'. operations without governmental permission, but if such
'
0 R. CAVES, Am TRANSPORT AND ITS REGULATORS 125 (1962).
"1 For a detailed discussion of these early mail acts see A. THOMAS, ECONOMIC
REGULATION OF SCHEDULED AIR TRANSPORT, ch. 2 (1952).
1"S. RICHMOND, REGULATION AND COMPETITION IN AIR TRANSPORTATION 5
(1961).
1"A total of sixty-six accidents occurred. H. SMITH, AIRWAYS: THE HISTORY
OF COMMERCIAL AVIATION IN THE UNITED STATES 249-58 (1942).
14The Air Mail Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 433 (1934).
" One proposal for deregulation involves returning to a competitive bidding
basis. See L. KEYES, FEDERAL CONTROL OF ENTRY INTO AIR TRANSPORTATION
66-72 (1951).
6 CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, REGULATORY REFORM: REPORT OF THE CAB
SPECIAL STAFF 31 (1975) [hereinafter cited as REGULATORY REFORM].
"The plan also failed because it divided authority over the industry among
three separate departments: the Post Office, the Interstate Commerce Commission,
and the Bureau of Air Commerce. This precluded effective control of the industry.
18 "Off-the-route" refers to operations in areas where no regulatory certificates
have been granted. No off-the-route operations are permitted under the present
system.
19761
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service proved harmful to the industry, the government could
enjoin a carrier from continuing operations. Also, an independent
non-mail carrier could inaugurate service competition against an
air mail contractor at any time."' During the period of 1934-1936,
the government regulated safety under the Bureau of Air Com-
merce, and subsidized mail carriers through the Post Office, but
did not require that a carrier obtain a certificate from the govern-
ment in order to enter the business of transporting air passengers
or cargo. During this period of free entry into competition, the
passenger and air express business of the industry increased three-
fold"0 while rates were substantially reduced.2' The existence of this
strong growth refutes the argument that the regulatory system im-
posed in 1938 brought growth to an industry that was previously
unhealthy and chaotic.
When the carriers without mail contracts began to compete on
the most profitable routes, the established carriers saw a threat
to their extensive capital investments, which had been made in the
cartel2 atmosphere of 1930-1934. They also saw a threat to their
share in the growth of the industry. These established carriers
banded together to form the Air Transport Association (ATA),
raised the cry of "cutthroat competition," and lobbied intensively
for protective legislation.' The main protection sought was govern-
mental restriction upon entry into the industry." To support its
objective of stricter regulation, the ATA presented four major
arguments: that regulation was needed to bring the economic
stability that was essential for safety in air travel; that regulation
was needed to end the chaotic conditions produced by "cutthroat
"Logan, Aeronautical Law Review-1936, 7 J. Am L. 450 (1936).
20 Hearings on H.R. 5234 and H.R. 4652 Before the House Comm. on Foreign
and Interstate Commerce, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., at 15-17 (1937) [hereinafter cited
as Hearings on H.R. 5234].
21 Id. at 26.
22 A cartel is a combination of producers of any product joined together to
control its production, sale, and price and to obtain a monopoly in any particular
industry or commodity. H. BLACK, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th Ed.) 270
(1968). During this period three holding companies received 84% of all air mail
contracts and did 90% of the business.
"Comment, Is Regulation Necessary? California Air Transportation and Na-




competition;" that the airlines were a natural monopoly, making
regulation essential; and that regulation was necessary for the
development of a national air system that served as many com-
munities as possible. None of the ATA's arguments supported the
regulatory system that Congress adopted in the Civil Aeronautics
Act of 1938. That Act relied on a certificate of public convenience
and necessity to limit entry into the industry and to shield the
established carriers from competition by requiring that the cer-
tificate be granted by the government before a carrier could com-
pete in any air transport market."
The first argument presented by the ATA in favor of regulation
was that governmental control would bring economic stability to
the industry and that this stability was essential for safe air travel.2
The ATA leadership emphasized the connection between economic
stability and safety." While it was undisputed that governmental
regulation in the field of air safety was essential," the connection
between the salutary effects of regulation on safety and the impact
of regulation on the economic situation was tenuous."0 Defining
safety standards is an activity of a different order than setting prices
and limiting markets.2"
2 This device had already been used by states and by other federal agencies
to control certain industries.
a) state-New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262 (1932);
b) Interstate Commerce Commission, 49 U.S.C. § 309(a)(1)-
United States v. Drum, 368 U.S. 370 (1962);
c) Federal Communications Commission-FCC v. Sanders Bros.
Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
2' Sec. 401(a) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, as amended,
49 U.S.C. §§ 1301 et seq. (1970), formerly Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch.
601, 52 Stat. 973 [hereinafter cited as Federal Aviation Act of 1958].
21 S. RICHMOND, REGULATION AND COMPETITION IN AIR TRANSPORTATION 8
(1961). The attention of Congress had been focused on air safety by such events
as the loss of Will Rogers and the death of Senator Cutting in an air crash in 1936.
21 Col. Edgar S. Gorrell of the ATA stated that: "This condition of financial
starvation not only makes it impossible for these lines to take advantage of possi-
ble technological improvements, but could lead to traffic competition of such in-
tensity that the accident ratio might accelerate instead of decline." Quoted in R.
KELLY, Tim SKY'S THE LIMIT 109 (1963).
21Such regulation would include air traffic control and establishing safety
standards for the construction and operation of aircraft. These safety regulations
are under the jurisdiction of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).
"°Kennedy Hearings, 1975 at 56 (testimony of James C. Miller III, Chief
Economist to the Council of Economic Advisors).
31 The FAA has the power to ensure that the airlines are of sufficient economic
strength to adhere to its safety standards. 14 C.F.R. §§ 248, 249 (1975).
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In addition to the allegations that competition would prevent
expenditures to insure the adequate safety of operations, the air-
lines argued that competition would prevent the attraction of
adequate capital into the industry and would threaten the main-
tenance of proper labor standards."2 These arguments seem to have
been based on a general anti-competitive theory which became
popular in government circles in the late 1930's and suggested that
undesirable conditions such as bad labor conditions, instability, and
uncertainty were inevitable when a firm was subjected to unre-
strained competitive pressure.' The actions of the American
economy since the Depression have shown that predictions of the
dire consequences of competition were overstated." In any case,
large scale economic regulation was not a reasonable or efficient
means of achieving air safety. The connection between economic
stability and safety is valid only to the extent that a desperate air-
line might cut corners on safety-related expenses. If safety is the
goal, direct regulation of airline practices is more sensible than
indirect economic regulation." The assertion that safety decreases
when competition increases is not persuasive."
The second argument advanced by the proponents of regulation
was that a regulatory system was needed to assure security and
stability in the air routes and to protect the carriers against "cut-
throat competition"3 ' that occurs when carriers in an over-capi-
talized market (i.e. too many sellers) cut fares to the point that
the increase in market demand created by lower fares will not
"2Civil Aeronautics Bill, H. Rep. 2254, 75th Cong., 2d Sess., at 2 (1938);
REGULATORY REFORM 20-23. This safety argument is still being used by the pro-
ponents of regulation. Lloyd-Jones, Deregulation and Its Potential Effects on Air-
line Operations, 41 J. Air L. & Com. 815 (1975).
3 3 
REGULATORY REFORM at 29.
4 Healy, Workable Competition in Air Transportation, 35 AM. ECON. REV.
239 (1945).
5 The predictions that unrestrained competition would be unsafe were dis-
proved by the unregulated California intrastate carriers. The safety regulations of
the FAA applied equally to both intrastate and interstate carriers. In fact, even
though many carriers failed economically, there were fewer fatal accidents per
passenger mile on the California intrastates than on the regulated trunks over the
same period. Is Regulation Necessary? at 1444.
The ATA pointed to the Army crashes of 1934 as an example of what com-
petition could produce, but the Army was not under the civil safety standards at
that time. In any case, the Army was not competing with anyone.
3 1 REGULATORY REFORM at 29.
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compensate for reduced unit revenues (i.e. dilution of revenues).'
In such a market a seller must cut his prices so low to keep his
customers that he cannot make a profit. The cost of production to
the seller becomes higher than the price the product can command.
It is far from clear, however, that a condition of cutthroat competi-
tion existed in the air transport industry prior to 1938."9 The
phenomenon of cutthroat competition occurs when members of the
industry are attempting to minimize their losses by recouping as
much of their fixed costs as possible. In other words, due to the
high fixed costs, it is better to sell at a substantial loss than not to
sell at all. But the airline industry is characterized by high variable
costs, rather than high fixed costs."0 This makes the model of cut-
throat competition inapplicable.
There was harmful competition in the airline industry prior to
1938. This competition was evidenced by the absurdly low bids the
carriers made to force out new competition.' In industries where
high fixed costs make entry into competition difficult, such low
bidding might occur in an unregulated market;' but this was not
the case in the airline industry. The harmful competition that did
exist was inspired by governmental regulation under the Mail Act.
These low bids served as examples in the ATA's argument that
cutthroat competition existed, but they were actually brought about
by the carriers' knowledge that any loss they sustained would be
covered by government sudsidy, that the rates could be adjusted
upward annually, and that protective legislation would soon be
38 Is Regulation Necessary? at 1423.
39 One may speculate whether there has ever been cutthroat competition in the
airline industry. The evidence of the intrastate carriers in California and Texas,
and of the unregulated commuter airlines shows that unrestrained competition
would lead to neither chaos nor unsafe conditions. See Kennedy Hearings, 1975
at 464-90 (presentation of William Jordan).40 R. CAVES, AIR TRANSPORT AND ITS REGULATORS 14, 56-60 (1962); Maclay
& Burt, Entry of New Carriers into Domestic Trunkline Air Transportation, 22
J. AIR L. & COM. 151-52 (1955); Kennedy Hearings, 1975 at 38 (testimony of
Thomas E. Kauper).
41 For example, a large airline bid one mill per mile for a new route at a time
when it had a petition before the ICC claiming that twenty-four cents per mile
was not a fair and reasonable rate. 83 CONG. REC. 6406 (1938) (remarks of
Congressman Boren).
42See the discussion of the natural monopoly argument, notes 49-62, infra
and accompanying text.
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enacted.' If cutthroat competition did exist, perhaps it was ag-
gravated if not actually caused by governmental regulation.
It appears that Congress accepted the allegation that chaotic
economic conditions existed at the time." On closer examination,
however, it seems that this chaos was more a fiction of ATA lobby-
ists than a reality. ' The president of the ATA admitted in 1937
that cutthroat competition and chaos were not present in the in-
dustry; he could only state his fear that these conditions would
develop. ' In fact, over the period preceding 1938, the relatively
free economic conditions had resulted in a great increase in traffic
volume accompanied by a decrease in rates." The below cost
pricing that existed was due to the low bidding practices of the
ATA members in the expectation that present subsidies and future
entry control would protect them. 8
A third argument advanced for regulation by the ATA was that
the airlines had the characteristics of a natural monopoly and
could be analogized to the railroads, which the government had
regulated for over fifty years. This analogy is faulty in several
respects. First, even if the analogy were valid, the development of
the antitrust laws since 1890 has reduced the potential for abuse
which the first railroad regulators had to combat."0 When railroad
regulation was adopted, there were no antitrust restraints on Ameri-
• "Congressman Lyle H. Boren referred to these abuses as "this final banquet
that they may gorge themselves before we put them on a diet of public con-
venience and necessity." 83 CONG. RFc. 6406 (1938) (remarks of Congressman
Boren).
"See Westwood & Bennett, A Footnote to the Legislative History of the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938 and Afterward, 42 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 309 (1967).
""Although the Board in support of its restrictive policies has repeatedly re-
lied on allegedly chaotic conditions in the industry at the time in seeking justifi-
cation for the policies it has adopted, the record fails to disclose that such condi-
tions existed." Memorandum Submitted by Senator Joseph C. O'Mahoney with
Respect to the Right of Entry in Air Transportation Under the Civil Aeronautics
Act, in Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., at 926 (1956) [hereinafter cited as O'Mahoney
Memorandum].
"Hearings on H.R. 5234, at 76.
"'See notes 20-21 supra and accompanying text.
48 83 CONG. REC. 6406 (1938) (remarks of Congressman Boren).
"' Hearings on H.R. 5234, at 66; S. RICHMOND, REGULATION AND COMPETITION
IN Am TRANSPORTATION 7 (1961).
"
0 Section 414 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. This section allows the
CAB to sanction airline practices that might otherwise be antitrust violations. See
Kennedy Hearings, 1975 at 41-42 (testimony of Thomas E. Kauper).
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can industry. The development of such restraints has reduced the
need for direct economic regulation. Indeed, the antitrust division
of the Department of Justice has called for relaxation of price and
route regulation in the airline industry." More importantly, the
economic conditions of the railroads are far different from those
of the airlines. The justification for the regulation of railroads was
that the initial investment needed to operate a railroad had to be
protected. The company had to purchase rights of way, lay down
tracks, survey and tunnel through mountainous districts, etc. In
contrast, the airlines operate above other persons' terrain between
airports furnished by governments." In 1935 it was pointed out
that airlines operate "on a far smaller initial expenditure and a far
smaller upkeep,"" and are in no need of this type of protection.
The airline industry has high variable costs, rather than high fixed
costs, which makes entry and exit in the industry easier. There is
not a great need to minimize losses by selling the product at any
cost, however low.
In the Congressional investigations that preceded the Act of
1938 the proponents of regulation claimed that the airline industry
was a "natural monopoly."'" In a natural monopoly the cost of
entering the market is very high and the product offered is neces-
sarily uniform." Examples of natural monopolies are the telephone
system and power utilities. In these natural monopolies the marginal
cost of growth is lower when the company is larger, there is a high
ratio of fixed to variable costs, the product is uniform, and capital,
once acquired, is immobile." The largest producer makes the largest
profits in a natural monopoly. The market forces cause smaller
firms to merge in order to attain economies of scale. Eventually,
only one huge producer remains. A natural monopoly requires
regulation because without outside controls one company would be
able to force out all competition and raise its prices arbitrarily,
knowing that the public had no alternative source for its product.
" Kennedy Hearings, 1975 at 35.
3" Hearings on S. 3027 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Interstate
Commerce, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., at 101 (1935) (testimony of Amelia Earhart).
3 Id. at 102.
4 Id.
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Studies have shown, however, that the theories of natural
monopoly do not neatly analogize to the airlines." Once an airline
has reached the size to operate approximately five modem aircraft,
costs do not decline as further growth occurs." Because of differ-
ences in scheduling and aircraft, the product is not completely
uniform. Finally, the capital is not immobile and financing is avail-
able. 9 Because the airline industry is not a natural monopoly,
market competition would function to lower prices, increase output,
and tailor production to suit customer preferences."0 An airline
could not arbitrarily raise its prices to gain an unreasonable profit,
because other companies could then obtain start-up capital, enter
the market, charge a reasonable rate, and attain healthy profits."1
Conversely, an industry member could never cut prices so low as
to force out competition; it could never recoup its losses by charging
super-competitive prices because others could quickly re-enter the
market and charge at the competitive rate. But for regulation this
relative ease of entry would keep the airline industry from being
monopolized by a few carriers."2 Rather than protecting the public
11 R. CAVES, AIR TRANSPORT AND ITS REGULATORS 14, 56-60 (1962), Maclay
and Burt, Entry of New Carriers into Domestic Trunkline Air Transportation, 22
J. AIR L. & COM. 151-52 (1955).
5 R. CAVES, AIR TRANSPORT AND ITS REGULATORS 56-60, 84-85 (1962).
The experience of the California intrastates shows that the barriers to entry
by competing lines are relatively easy to surmount. W. JORDAN, AIRLINE REGU-
LATION IN AMERICA (1970). G. DOUGLAS AND J. MILLER, ECONOMIC REGULATION
OF DOMESTIC AIR TRANSPORT: THEORY AND POLICY 13-17 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as DOUGLAS AND MILLER].
0 This is because the airline industry is characterized by high variable costs,
rather than by high fixed costs. This is admitted even by proponents of regulation.
Bluestone, The Problem of Competition Among Domestic Trunk Airlines-Part
11, 21 J. AIR L. & COM. 57-68 (1954). A recent article has asserted that fixed
costs (overhaul bases, rent for terminal space, and the reservation system) con-
stitute 40% of industry costs, and that this amount constitutes high fixed costs.
Brenner, Need for Continued Economic Regulation of Air Transport, 41 J. AIR
L. & COM. 793 (1975).
1 An antitrust lawyer from the Justice Department has testified that the airline
industry lacks the characteristics of a natural monopoly. Kennedy Hearings, 1975,
at 38 (testimony of Thomas E. Kauper).
62 The ease of entry should keep the number of producers in the industry high
enough to avoid the problems of oligopoly. The Assistant Attorney General, Anti-
trust Division has called for a relaxation in regulation, indicating that no unman-
ageable antitrust problems should arise. Id. at 35; cf. the assertion that deregulation
would indeed lead to a monopoly in D. LOCKLIN, ECONOMICS OF TRANSPORTATION
827 (1966).
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against a natural monopoly, CAB regulation prevents competition
that otherwise would be economically feasible.."
The fourth argument for regulation is based not on economics,
but on public policy. The ATA asserted that regulation was needed
to ensure the development of a national air system, linking as many
communities as possible. The key to this argument is the concept
of internal subsidies (also known as cross subsidies). The airlines
argued that their predominance on lucrative routes should be
protected in order to ensure profits to compensate for the losses
the airlines incurred serving smaller communities." In other words,
the airlines claimed that if they had to charge competitive prices
on all routes, they could not afford to serve smaller communities.'
The ATA has used this argument to predict that deregulation would
force a sharp reduction in the number of communities served, but
this argument has been widely assailed.'
This policy argument rests on the assumption that a large amount
of internal subsidization exists in the airline industry."7 Studies have
shown, however, that the extent of internal subsidization presently
existing is miniscule." In any case, the use of internal subsidies is
inefficient and inequitable. John W. Barnum, Acting Secretary of
Transportation, testified to a Senate Subcommittee that: "Carriers
should not be forced to lose money or operate on the assumption
that other routes will subsidize those producing inadequate rev-
63 Jordan, Producer Protection, Prior Market Structure and the Effects of Gov-
ernment Regulation, 15 J. OF LAW & EcoN. 151 (1972). This writer's conclusion
is that: "The CAB is an institutionalized restraint on the citizen's freedom to travel
at reasonable prices, and an unnecessary burden on the nation's taxpayers. Its
regulation is permeated by a penchant for secrecy and unbridled bias for the
industry."
The economic feasibility of competition upon deregulation is not conceded by
the proponents of regulation. A recent article takes the position that the airline
industry would become more wasteful and less competitive upon deregulation.
Brenner, Need for Continued Economic Regulation of Air Transport, 41 J. AiR
L. & COM. 793 (1975).
" The proponents of regulation argument that internal subsidies are needed to
keep the national air service system intact. Brenner, Need for Continued Economic
Regulation of Air Transport, 41 J. AIR L. & COM. 793 (1975); Lloyd-Jones, De-
regulation and Its Potential Effect on Airline Operations, 41 J. AIR L. & CoM. 815
(1975).
"Id.
See the series of papers in Kennedy Hearings, 1975 at 410-36.
7 Id. at 57 (testimony of James C. Miller III).
I6 Id. at 392 (letter from James C. Miller I1).
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enue. Cross-subsidies are inefficient economically and in practice
do not work." 9 The inequities of internal subsidies arise from re-
quiring a traveler on a heavy route to pay for part of the ticket
of a traveler on a light route."° Such subsidies are hidden7' and,
according to the CAB itself, contrary to the public interest." A
more equitable way to achieve this public policy goal would be to
have the community that benefits from the service directly and
openly subsidize that service." In some areas, subsidies may not be
needed at all under a free entry system. While small town service
is not as profitable as other routes, this does not mean that an
efficient and adaptable local carrier could not survive in these
markets."'
II. THE 1938 ACT AND COMPETITION
While the ATA's arguments for regulation were not convincing,
the fact remains that the Congress passed a broad measure reg-
ulating the commercial air transport industry in 1938. The actions
of the CAB, however, have not been consistent with the intent
expressed by Congress in passing the bill.' The early Congressional
discussions of regulation emphasized the need to preserve competi-
tion and to assure that new carriers be allowed to enter the
market. In 1935 the Federal Aviation Commission reported, after
careful study, that:
[T]here must be no policy of a permanent freezing of the present
air transport map, with respect either to the location of its routes
or the identity of their operators. The present operators of airlines
have no inherent right to a monopoly of the routes they serve."'
19 Id. at 13 (testimony of John W. Barnum).
70 Id. at 26 (testimony of Lewis Engman).
71 Id. at 393 (letter from James C. Miller III).
72 CAB Order No. 74-3-82 (March 18, 1974). See DOUGLAS AND MILLER at
118.
"Kennedy Hearings, 1975 at 393. A proposal presently before Congress calls
for such a system of direct subsidies. H.R. 10261, S. 2551, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975) at § 8.
" Maclay and Burt, Entry of New Carriers into Domestic Trunkline Air
Transportation, 22 J. AIR L. & COM. 154 (1955). Cf. the conclusion that service
to smaller cities would, in fact disappear in D. LOCKLIN, EcoNoMIcs OF TRANS-
PORTATION 827 (1966).
7" Kennedy Hearings, 1975 at 38.
" Report of the Federal Aviation Commission, S. Doc. 15, 74th, 1st Sess., at
62 (1935).
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It was the Senate's understanding that if a carrier demonstrated
the ability to serve a needed new route, it would be granted a
certificate.7
Despite Congressional claims that competition would be pre-
served, some observers perceived the threat of regulation to com-
petition. An expert in the field detected a pattern in Congressional
actions in 1936 that indicated "an attempt, intentional or other-
wise, to freeze the picture of air transportation in the U.S."'" The
Department of Commerce also noted this pattern and in 1937 sent
to Congress a prescient warning of the impact of the contemplated
regulations.m Despite these warnings, Congress proceeded with the
legislation, continually assuring itself that freedom of entry and
healthy competition would be maintained under the new system."°
Any applicant who demonstrated that it met the safety rules would
be able to enter the industry.81 Senator Patrick A. McCarren stated
77 Hearings on S. 3027 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Interstate
Commerce, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., at 105 (1935). Senator King stated if the bill
would have the effect of freezing the number of companies in the industry, it
should not be passed. The Senator's view was that:
If it authorizes their activities to the exclusion of others who may
desire to enter this field, then I think there should be some amend-
ments that would fully protect those who are interested in the de-
velopment of this great act.
83 CONG. REC. 6851 (1938) (remarks of Senator King).
Senator Truman assured the Senate that the bill would have no such effect.
83 CONG. REc. 6852 (1938) (remarks of Senator Truman).
78 Logan, Aeronautical Law Review-1936, 7 J. OF AIR L. & COM. 450 (1936).
7 9 Hearings on S. 2 and S. 1760 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
Interstate Commerce, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., at 89 (1937). "The Department of
Commerce is unalterably opposed to the issuance of such certificates at this time
when the air transport industry is still in a metamorphic state; when the airways
map is still devoid of feeder or secondary routes; and when there is not yet even
enough competition to promote the potential traffic. It is greatly to be feared that
the immediate institution of such requirements will produce an undue advantage
to the three or four powerful airlines which are already well entrenched and a
detriment to the weaker ones." Id.
00'Mahoney Memorandum at 926.
8lid. at 923.
There was nothing in the debates in either House to give the slight-
est ground for believing that anybody in Congress, or indeed in the
industry, whatever his secret designs, if any, may have been, to
establish a system which would give to any bureau of the Govern-
ment the power, on its own discretion, to restrict the development
of aviation and to drive out of the business of air transportation
any individual or any group willing to risk its capital is the pioneer-
ing of this industry, while at the same time obeying all the neces-
sary rules to maintain the maximum degree of safety in the air.
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that the first object of any act should be to ensure that the airlines
comply with the antitrust laws of the country so as to provide the
greatest protection for competition."' Senator Harry S. Truman,
then the chairman of the subcommittee considering the bill, stated
that any provision that would effectively limit the number of major
carriers to those presently in existence "ought to be changed."8
Truman stated on the Senate floor that the Act of 1938 would not
have the effect of freezing the present routes or allowing only the
existing major carriers to develop new routes." Finally, the general
tenor of the debate was that the CAB would be an instrument to
get the airline industry out of its present crisis (if one existed);"S
no one mentioned that the CAB would still function after the in-
dustry had matured.
It may be concluded that the Congress intended to maintain free
entry of new competition into the airline industry. The existing
airlines were to receive no undue preference in the granting of new
routes."0 The most worthy applicant, based on the facts of the
route proposals, was to be chosen, whether it was a new or old
carrier.
Unfortunately, the clear intent that arose from the debates was
not carried over into the statute. In the Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938 the mandate to preserve competition was softened by the
phrase "to the extent necessary."" Further, Congress stated other
goals, such as improving relations among air carriers that were
potentially inconsistent with the goal of encouraging competition."'
82 83 CONG. REC. 6731 (1938) (remarks of Senator McCarren).
83 Hearings on S. 2 and S. 1760 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
Interstate Commerce, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., at 305 (1937).
84 83 CONG. REc. 6727 (1938) (remarks of Senator Truman).
8583 CONG. REC. 6507 (1938) (remarks of Congressman Randolph). Legisla-
tion is needed due to the "present disorderly financial situation." (emphasis added)
" Colonel Gorrell emphasized that the Act would bring in a number of new
companies and produce additional air lines on many routes. He agreed that these
effects would be desirable. Hearings on H.R. 5234 at 85,344.
11 While opponents of regulation think this language as unwieldy and vague,
proponents praise it as being "remarkedly flexible." Callison, Airline Regulation-
A Hoax?, 41 J. AIR L. & CoM. 747 (1975).
80 Section 102 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 provides:
Consideration of matters in public interest by the Board
In the exercise and performance of its powers and duties under
this chapter, the Board shall consider the following, among other
things, as being in the public interest, and in accordance with the
public convenience and necessity:
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Much of the inconsistency that has appeared in the CAB decisions
concerning competition might be traced to the vague guidance pro-
vided by the Act.8"
III. THE CAB AND COMPETITION
The CAB was entrusted by Congress with the task of eco-
(a) The encouragement and development of an air-transportation
system properly adapted to the present and future need of the for-
eign and domestic commerce of the United States, of the Postal
Service, and of the national defense;
(b) The regulation of air transportation in such manner as to rec-
ognize and preserve the inherent advantages of, assure the highest
degree of safety in, and foster sound economic conditions in, such
transportation, and to improve the relations between, and coordinate
transportation by, air carriers;
(c) The promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient service
by air carriers at reasonable charges, without unjust discriminations,
undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive competi-
tive practices;
(d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound de-
velopment of an air-transportation system properly adapted to the
needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States,
of the Postal Service, and of the national defense;
(e) The promotion of safety in air commerce; and
(f) The promotion, encouragement, and development of civil
aeronautics. Pub. L. 85-726, Title I, § 102, Aug. 23, 1958, 72 Stat.
740. (emphasis added)
H.R. 10521, S. 2551, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) would change this section to
make the mandate to foster competition more clear:
Sec. 4. Section 102 is amended to read as follows:
DECLARATION OF POLICY: THE BOARD
Sec. 102. In the exercise and performance of its powers and du-
ties under the Act, the Board shall consider the following, among
other things, as being in the public interest, and in accordance with
the public convenience and necessity:
(a) The encouragement and development of an air transportation
system which is responsive to the needs of the public and is adapted
to the present and future needs of the foreign and domestic com-
merce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the nation-
al defense;
(b) The provision of a variety of adequate, economic, efficient
and low-cost services by air carriers without unjust discriminations,
undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or deceptive practices;
and thz need to improve relations among and coordinate transpor-
tation by air carriers;
(c) Maximum reliance on competitive market forces and on ac-
tual and potential competition to provide the needed air transpor-
tation system;
(d) The encouragement of new air carriers; and
(e) The importance of this highest degree of safety in air com-
merce.
89 Kennedy Hearings, 1975 at 684-88 (testimony of Donald Baker).
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nomically regulating air commerce for the public good. The Civil
Aeronautics Act of 19380 set out six standards to guide the
Board's determination of what is in the public interest, including
encouraging and developing an air transport system, fostering a
high degree of safety and sound economic conditions, and pro-
moting reasonable fare charges and competition to the extent
necessary to ensure full development of the system. 1 The tool with
which the CAB attempts to implement these policy guidelines is
the certificate of public convenience and necessity which all
interstate' carriers of any substantial size" must obtain in order to
operate. These certificates cannot be abandoned!' or transferred"
without permission of the Board.
At its inception the purpose of economic regulation was to
achieve the stabilization and development of the industry by reg-
ulating mail compensation and transport tariffs and through control
of business structures and practices." This purpose indicates that
the CAB was intended to differ from the older federal regulatory
agencies that were created to prevent abuses by industry. The CAB
was a "New Deal" commission,8 paternalistic in concept, and was
conceived to promote, aid, and control the industry.9 In keeping
90 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973 (1938), now codified as
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301
et seq. (1970). [hereinafter cited as Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938]
91 See note 88 supra for the text of this section.
92 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 at S 401(a): "No air carrier shall engage in
any air transportation unless there is in force a certificate issued by the Board
authorizing such air carrier to engage in such transportation."
93 Under the Constitution the power of the national government to regulate
commerce extends only to interstate commerce. U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8.
"Section 416(b). Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 authorizes exemptions when
formal licensing would be a burden "by reason of the limited extent of, or unusual
circumstances affecting the operations of such carrier . .. and is not in the
public interest." Proposed Aviation Act of 1975, H.R. 10261, S. 2551, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1975), S 7 would increase this exemption to include airplanes with
capacities of up to fifty-six passengers.
9 Section 401(j), Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938.
"Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 at § 401(h). Proposed Aviation Act of 1975
H.R. 10261, S. 2551, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), would change these rules by
allowing the airline to abandon an unprofitable route unless the community in-
volved agreed to compensate the airline for its losses.
97 J. FREDERICK, COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORTATION 268 (1946).
" Jones, The Anomaly of the Civil Aeronautics Board in American Govern-
ment, 20 J. AIR L. & COM. 142 (1953).
991 d. This concept of the role of the CAB is not consistent with Congress's
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with its control function, the CAB may not issue a certificate for a
route to an applicant unless it is "fit, willing and able to perform
air transportation properly."'' " The Board has interpreted its man-
date from Congress to include an additional inquiry: even if the
applicant is fit, willing and able, the Board will not grant the
certificate if it determines that the present carriers on the route will
be damaged by the new entry."1 In making this inquiry, the CAB
is following its interpretation of the Act, rather than the pro,-
competition intent expressed by Congress.
According to the 1938 statements of Congress, the key declara-
tion of policy which the Board must interpret and follow is the one
concerning maintenance of competition.' 3 It would therefore be
instructive, in an inquiry into the functioning of the CAB, to see
how this clause has been interpreted. The Board first interpreted
the Congressional mandate to mean that competition was to be
allowed to the extent necessary to carry out the other policy goals
of the Act."3 Three years later the same clause was interpreted to
provide a presumption in favor of competition.'" An airline already
on a route had the burden of proving that the proposed competition
would be destructive of the other ends of regulation." This in-
terpretation appears to be consistent with the Congressional intent.'
expressed goal of fostering competition. The conclusion appears to be that the
Act itself was inartfully drafted.
100 S 401(d)(1), Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. One writer has asserted that
the granting of these broad discretionary powers to the Board is an unconstitu-
tional delegation of authority by Congress. Jones, The Anomaly of the Civil
Aeronautics Board in American Government, 20 J. AIR L. & COM. 149 (1953).
101 Boston-Maine Airways, Inc., Bangor-Monckton Operations, 2 C.A.B. 319,
827 (1940), See Roberts, Criteria for the Award of a Foreign Air Route to a
Domestic Air Carrier, 15 S. C. L. REv. 867, 894-95 (1964).
102 See note 88 supra for the text of this section. This comment uses "com-
petition" mainly to mean the entry of new carriers into routes with the trunklines.
If "competition" means two or more existing trunklines serving city-pairs, com-
petition has increased under the CAB. See Callison, Airline Regulations-A
Hoax?, 41 J. AIR L. & CoM. 747 (1975).
103 Mid-Continent Airlines, Inc., Twin Cities-Des Moines-Kansas City-St. Louis
Operation, 2 C.A.B. 63 (1940).
10 Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc., Additional North-South CaIifornia
Services, 4 C.A.B. 373 (1943).
' Id.
103 During this period the CAB made a clear statement on the advantages of
competition:
The greatest gain from competition, whether actual or potential,
is the stimulus to devise and experiment with new operating tech-
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Within a few years, however, the Board completely reversed itself
and held that there should be a presumption against competition.'
Rather than maintaining an established interpretation of the man-
date to allow competition, the CAB has been remarkably incon-
sistent."' One writer asserts that the Board's attitude toward com-
petition changes according to the ebb and flow of the economy.
In prosperous times competition is encouraged, while in times of
recession, additional competition is not allowed." These shifts in
interpretation leave no comprehensible criteria for predicting Board
actions in one of its most important activities."'
The CAB is not always to blame for anti-competitive govern-
mental decisions in the air transport industry. At times the CAB
has sought to encourage competition and has been blocked by the
trunklines in the courts. In 1955 the CAB sought to grant per-
manent authority to supplemental air carriers by exempting them
from the certification requirement. The Circuit Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia disallowed this action.'11 In response, the CAB
sought to issue "supplemental certificates" to twenty-six applicants,
but this, too, was blocked."' The fate of these Board actions may
help to explain the general anti-competitive tone of CAB de-
cisions."'
The fact of CAB inconsistency remains. Neither the ATA nor
aspiring applicants can easily predict the CAB decisions in par-
ticular cases. There are several reasons for this inconsistency.
niques and new equipment, to develop new means of acquiring and
promoting business, including the rendering of better service to the
customer and to the Nation and affording the Government a com-
parative yardstick by which the performance of the carriers may
be measured.
Hawaiian Case, 7 C.A.B. 83, 103-4 (1946).
10 Southern Service to the West, 12 C.A.B. 518, 533-35 (1951).
38 H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES-THE NEED FOR
BETTER DEFINITION OF STANDARDS 77 (1962).
109 Dockser, Airline Service Abandonment and Consolidation-A Chapter in
the Battle Against Subsidization, 32 J. OF AIR L. & CoM. 496 (1966).
1"0H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES-THE NEED FOR
BETTER DEFINITION OF STANDARDS 97 (1962).
"' American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 235 F.2d 845 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. de-
nied, 353 U.S. 905 (1957).
" United Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 278 F.2d 446 (D.C. Cir. 1959), vacated sub
nora. All Am. Airways, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 364 U.S. 297 (1960).
..See Comment, CAB Regulation of Supplemental Air Carriers, 76 HARV.
L. REv. 1450 (1963).
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First, there are the varying interpretations of statutory standards
and methods caused by economic and political fluctuations.11" There
also is the problem that the CAB's goals are not clearly defined."'
The only clear goal Congress provided was to nurture the growth
of an infant industry. This goal has been accomplished."' Now that
airlines are the dominant passenger carriers over long distances,11
this goal is not helpful in defining policy. The CAB appears to
have adopted a new goal to maintain the position of present air
carriers, regardless of their shortcomings. The CAB has not ad-
mitted that this is its goal, however, since it is inconsistent with
the Congressional charge to the Board. '18
A third problem arises because the mechanical function of the
Board precludes long range planning of air route patterns. The
CAB regulates the airline industry by deciding those cases that are
brought before it.1"' This case by case approach, coupled with a
steady turnover in the membership of the Board, makes effective
planning difficult." ° Further, the Board fills three inconsistent roles
in approaching each case; it is at once the promoter of the airline
industry, the regulator of the same industry, and the judge weighing
private interests and property rights against the public interest.'
Since the Board is filling inconsistent roles and decides only the
cases brought before it, the decisions of the Board are less pre-
dictable.
A former member of the CAB has pointed out that independent
national regulatory commissions are an anomaly in the political
structure of the United States.' Our governmental system is based
generally on the separation of powers among the three branches
"'See notes 98-101 supra and accompanying text.
115 R. MILLER, DOMESTIC AIRLINE EFFICIENCY 34 (1963).
116 Whether or not the goal would have been accomplished more quickly
without regulation is unknown.
17 See note 6 supra.
18Section 102(c), (d), Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938.
119 Hector, Problems of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commissions,
69 YALE L.J. 931 (1960).
1 Jones, The Anomaly of the Civil Aeronautics Board in American Govern-
ment, 20 J. AIR L. & COM. 140, 148 (1953).
11 Id. at 147. "It is well nigh impossible that all three can be successfully
combined in the same proceeding and substantial justice be done to all concerned."
"I Id. at 140.
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of the government, but in these independent agencies the legisla-
tive, executive and judicial powers are united.2 ' Because the initia-
tive to develop routes is delegated to the applying airlines, the
CAB is unable to formulate a consistent route policy. These
factors, when joined with the CAB's changing interpretation of
fostering competition,12' help explain the inconsistencies in the
actions of the CAB.
Generally the CAB has not allowed the degree of competition
that Congress anticipated." Vagueness in the terms of the Act is
a partial explanation. Moreover, the Act allows the Board to ap-
prove such anti-competitive practices as mergers, pooling agree-
ments, and interlocking directorates if they are judged to be in the
"public interest. 12 Such measures could be in the public interest,
but they are more likely to be only in the interest of the airlines
involved.12'
An examination of the results of the CAB's rulings over the
years leads to the conclusion that competition has been less im-
portant to the CAB than maintaining the existing carriers.1" The
impact of the CAB's attitude toward the entry of new carriers into
competition with existing carriers is plain. No new trunk service
123 J. FREDERICK, COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORTATION 198 (1946).
124 See note 79 supra. An ideal membership for the Board could hypothetically
reach results consistent with the charge of Congress. But such a membership is
unlikely and unrealistic.
,2 While the economic state of the airlines remains less than robust, the fol-
lowing will probably accurately reflect the CAB's attitude: "[Tihe authorization
of multiple competition at a time of economic stringency such as this calls in
our judgment for both a clear showing of feasibility and a substantial justification
in terms of public benefits to be received." CAB Order No. 70-7-24 (July 6, 1970).
See note 79 supra.
12 Sections 408, 409, and 412, Federal Aviation Act of 1958; See L. KEYES,
FEDERAL CONTROL OF ENTRY INTO AIR TRANSPORTATION 108 (1951). These provi-
sions encourage non-aggressiveness in the industry. The phenomenon of "conscious
parallelism" could allow this non-aggressiveness to continue even after deregula-
tion. "Conscious parallelism" occurs when the members of an industry adjust their
prices and production so that all members make a profit, even though no overt
agreement has been made. The larger the number of producers, however, the less
likely conscious parallelism becomes. The relatively low entry costs of the airline
industry could keep the number of producers sufficiently large to avoid this phe-
nomenon.
127 See Kennedy Hearings 1975 at 1151-63 (testimony of Ralph Nader). Com-
petition is generally accepted as an efficient tool for the attainment of lower prices.
But see Bluestone, The Problem of Competition Among Domestic Trunk Airlines
-Part 1, 20 J. AIR L. & CoM. 391-96 (1953).
1I See notes 123-27 supra and 137-51 infra.
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carriers have been admitted into domestic air transportation since
1938. '29 Since 1950 there have been ninety-four serious applica-
tions for trunkline authority; the CAB has approved none of
them.'" The Act contained a "grandfather clause" that gave cer-
tification to those trunk carriers already in existence in 1938."'
Sixteen trunklines were certificated in this manner. Of these, ten
remain in operation. 3' This reduction resulted from mergers ap-
proved by the CAB. Similarly, the Board admitted nineteen local
service carriers in 1950. These carriers absorbed the influx of
equipment and trained pilots into the industry following World
War I. They generally flew smaller aircraft over shorter routes
and did not compete with the "grandfather" trunklines. No local
service carriers have been admitted since 1950, and their number
has shrunk to nine"2 as the less successful carriers merged with the
more successful ones.'"
An original motive of the CAB for protecting the trunk carriers
from outside competition'"-to reduce the government subsidy pay-
ments to the existing carriers"-is no longer valid since no trunk
carrier has received a subsidy since 1959. ' Even when this motive
had validity Congress was worried about the CAB allowing the
grandfather trunklines to dominate the industry. In 1942 the
Senate passed a resolution encouraging the Board to report as soon
as possible on
'29 CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, HANDBOOK OF AIRLINE STATISTICS, 1973 10
(1974). The proponents of regulation admit this but attempt to ameliorate the im-
pact of the exclusion by stating that many modem non-trunk carriers are now
larger than the trunklines were themselves in 1939, Callison, Airline Regulation-
A Hoax?, 41 J. AIR L. & COM. 747 (1975). But trunklines carry ninety-two per-
cent of domestic scheduled revenue passenger miles. The non-trunk carriers are
not a major source of competition. Heymsfeld, An Introduction to Regulatory
Reform for Air Transportation, 41 J. AIR L. & CoM. 665 (1975).
110 REGULATORY REFORM 49.
11 Section 401(c) Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938.
132 DOUGLAS AND MILLER 110.
132 REGULATORY REFORM 53.
134 Another great cause of reduction of the number of carriers was due to the
courts, not the CAB. See notes 106-08 supra. In California failing airlines simply
went out of business; no mergers took place. W. JORDAN, AIRLINE REGULATION IN
AMERICA 24 (1970).
112 DOUGLAS AND MILLER 110-12.
'3 R. CAVES, AIR TRANSPORT AND ITS REGULATORS 170 (1962).
137 Id.
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the steps the Board contemplates taking with respect to the is-
suance, under Sec. 401 of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, of
certificates to air carriers who were not engaged in air transporta-
tion on the date of enactment of such Act. 8"
The Board responded by promising to foster the entry of new
trunk carriers when the propitious time arose.'" Thirty-four years
later, the propitious time has not yet arisen.
When an aspiring trunkline approaches the CAB, it faces a
conundrum. All that a new applicant can offer to the CAB is a
lower rate schedule; it cannot prove its capability until it begins to
operate, and it cannot operate without permission. Unfortunately,
the CAB tends to characterize price proposals from new applicants
as "unrealistic."'" By dismissing these proposals almost out of hand
the CAB has aborted potential price competition and has main-
tained the stability of the existing trunklines. Such actions seem
to reveal a CAB assumption that the interest of the trunklines and
the interest of the traveling public coincide.
The dearth of new trunkline carriers is evidence that the CAB
does not encourage competition. An examination of the decisions
handed down by the CAB also supports the hypothesis that the
CAB is industry oriented and does not regulate domestic air trans-
port in the public interest."' In 1954 the CAB refused to allow
an airline to extend its service from San Diego to Tijuana at
rates significantly lower that those prevailing at the time.' In 1963
the CAB ruled that California airlines, whose intrastate rates were
far below those of the CAB regulated carriers, could not carry
passengers who were connecting from an interstate flight.'" These
are cases when the public clearly is penalized in order to maintain
an inefficient airline system. In 1965 the CAB further attacked the
efficient1" California carriers by ruling that they could not carry
18S. Res. 228, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 88 Cong., Rec. 3173 (1942).
139S. Doc. 206, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942).
140 REGULATORY REFORM 53.
14' W. JORDAN, AIRLINE REGULATION IN AMERICA 226 (1970).
142 See Pillai, Government Regulation in the Private Interest, 40 J. Am L. &
CoM. 29 (1974). Kennedy Hearings, 1975 at 1151-63 (testimony of Ralph Nader).
141 CAB Order No. E-8782 (adopted Oct. 10, 1954).
"CAB Order No. E-19655 (adopted June 6, 1963).
1' The efficiency of the intra-state airlines has been used by the opponents of
regulation. See W. JORDAN, AIRLINE REGULATION IN AMERICA (1970); Is Regula-
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passengers to the California side of Lake Tahoe on the grounds
that some of those on board would probably be destined for Nevada
and would, therefore, be interstate passengers.I" Another attack
against intrastate carriers occurred in 1964 when the CAB brought
an intra-Hawaii airline under its regulations on the ground that
the routes were over international waters and within federal
jurisdiction."' In 1967 World Airways, a non-trunk airline, offered
to establish transcontinental scheduled service with very substantial
fare reductions." ' For years the Board consistently refused to act
upon the petition and, through a technicality, eventually dismissed
it from the docket as "stale."" In 1976 a similar World Airways
proposal was also rejected.' By denying these attempts to com-
pete with the regulated carriers, the CAB blunts the competitive
forces that would produce lower fares for the traveling public.
In 1970 the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia openly
recognized that the CAB was dominated by a pro-industry bias. "'
The public's interest in competition is not being fully served.
Another example of a CAB action which prevented competition
is the Board's treatment of the non-scheduled irregular airlines
that developed after World War II. When the irregulars applied
for certificates to provide scheduled service over their routes, the
trunk carriers intervened. Even though the irregulars offered lower
rates and a proven willingness to develop rapidly untapped markets,
the CAB granted all of the routes to the trunklines"' by using an
internal subsidy theory."' A final illustration of the CAB's anti-
tion Necessary? The proponents of regulation assert that no analogy is appropriate,
since the intrastates serve unrepresentative city-pair routes. See Rasenberger, De-
regulation and Local Airline Service-An Assessment of Risks, 41 J. AIR L. &
CoM. 843 (1975).
11 CAB Order No. E-22387 (adopted June 30, 1965).
147 CAB v. Island Airlines, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 990 (D.C. Hawaii 1964).
Application of World Airways, CAB Docket No. 18468.
'
4 9 DOUGLAS AND MILLER 113.
15 In 1976 World Airways' offer to provide transcontinental service for less
than half of the fare charged by trunkline carriers was rejected by the CAB. CAB
Docket No. 27693 (Decided Jan. 23, 1976). For the World Airways proposal see
Kennedy Hearings, 1975 at 565-70.
"' Moss v. CAB, 430 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
152 Transcontinental Coach-Type Service Case, 14 C.A.B. 720, 724 (1951). A
third type of unregulated carrier is the small commuter airline. This type of line
is excused from regulation by § 416(b) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.
113 REGULATORY REFORM 36.
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competitive decisions is found in Continental Air Lines, Inc. v.
CAB. " In this case the CAB three times rejected Continental's
application to enter the Denver-San Diego route in competition
against Western Airlines," even though an administrative law judge
had specifically found that Western's service on the route was
inadequate and that the route could easily support two carriers. '
On appeal to the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia, the
issue was the CAB's interpretation of the Congressional mandate
concerning competition. After examining the evidence of legisla-
tive intent the court concluded that: "When sufficient traffic
exists to support competition, certification of competing carriers
is mandated by the Act as providing the best means of effectuating
the other public interest goals contained in Sec. 102."' On con-
sidering the record in the case, the court found that the CAB was
erroneous as a matter of law in rejecting the administrative law
judge's finding that there was sufficient traffic to support com-
petition.
5 8
The result of the CAB route granting procedures has been a
strict control upon the entry of new carriers into the industry.
Without the threat of competition posed by new entrants, the market
structure has tended to become static.' The lack of new entries
and the natural attrition by which the less efficient carriers are
absorbed by the more efficient have caused the number of operat-
ing trunklines to decrease steadily."' The scarcity of entrants en-
courages inefficiency in the existing carriers because the threat of
'54 519 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
'5 By this time, the route was carrying 130,000 passengers a year more than
many other routes where competition was allowed. Continental Airlines, Inc. v.
CAB, 519 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
11 Id. at 947. That Continental is exceptional among the trunk carriers is illus-
trated by the fact that it is the only trunk to call for an end to the freeze on
new entries into the industry. Continental's president stated: "[W]e believe that
new entrants maintain vitality in the industry. They bring innovation, which
means public benefits. Moreover the mere threat of new entrants being permitted
into the industry spurs incumbents to better serve the public." REGULATORY RE-
FORM 13.
... Continental Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 519 F.2d 954 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
"I Id. at 959.
' REGULATORY REFORM 126.
0 See note 126 supra.
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new competition is not present to goad the airline to perform at
their best level."'
Another result of the regulatory system is that it focuses com-
petition on service quality and thereby encourages excess capacity.
and a level of service that is higher than the traveling public would
demand. The trunklines are unable to compete for a larger share
of the industry's traffic by offering lower rates or new routes. Con-
sequently, their only area of competition is service quality.' By
offering larger, more glamorous aircraft and more flights per day
than the market justifies, the airlines increase their capacity to an
excess.'" This forces an increase in the cost of each occupied seat.
The resulting service might be better than the average consumer
would choose in a trade-off between price and service."
These factors combine to produce a lack of competition. By
restricting the entry of new carriers, regulation may have produced
higher fares than the quality of service justifies.' The CAB policy
tends to insulate the existing carriers from the potential new com-




This comment does not call for deregulation; it is only meant
to clarify the discussion concerning regulation by presenting the
past arguments for adopting regulation and by examining the
past record of the regulatory system. The arguments made for
regulation at the time of the passage of the Civil Aeronautics Act
16' Green and Nader, Economic Regulation vs. Competition: Uncle Sam the
Monopoly Man, 82 YALE L.J. 879 (1973).
12 Excess capacity exists when there is a continual number of empty seats on
aircraft servicing a certain route. The percentage of seats filled on each flight is
called the "load factor." A recent article has asserted that excess capacity would
increase in a deregulated environment. Brenner, Need for Continued Economic
Regulation of Air Transport, 41 J. AIR L. & COM. 793 (1975). The article claims
that price competition is impossible among airlines, leaving service quality as the
only area for competition.
1' W. JORDAN, AIRLINE REGULATION IN AMERICA 229 (1970).
164 COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS, ANNUAL REPORT 154 (1975).
' ' REGULATORY REFORM 2.
"6 COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS, ANNUAL REPORT 155 (1975).
" REGULATORY REFORM 54. The only area where competition is open is in
the quality of services offered. Id. at 47.
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of 1938 are not persuasive. First, the connection between economic
stability and air safety is not strong enough to support economic
regulation. Secondly, chaos and cutthroat competition did not exist
in the industry prior to 1938. The fluctuations that did exist were
the products of the Mail Act of 1934, the infant stage of the in-
dustry, and the generally depressed economy. Thirdly, the airline
industry is not a natural monopoly and need not be regulated as
such. ' Finally, the maintenance of a national air system would
be more fairly and efficiently achieved by direct subsidies rather
than by internal subsidies.
The intent of Congress in passing the Act was to preserve com-
petition and free entry into the industry. Although the language
of the Act is vague, this intent was sufficiently clear for the court
in Continental to hold that an anti-competitive decision of the
Board was erroneous as a matter of law. The empirical evidence
suggests that the existing airlines have been protected at the ex-
pense of aspiring applicants and of consumers. Unless the pro-
ponents of regulation can demonstrate that these decisions are
actually in the public interest, it would appear that the Con-
gressional intent would be better served by a relaxation of economic
regulations.
The decision to adopt a plan of deregulation or to retain the
present system should be made on the basis of arguments applicable
to the present and future state of the industry.' The arguments
advanced in the past did not justify the adoption of regulation,
and the record of the CAB in controlling the domestic air transport
industry does not seem to justify its retention.
161 A recent article has asserted that, although the airlines are not a natural
monopoly, there are sufficient similarities to natural monopolies to justify regula-
tion. Lloyd-Jones, De-regulation and Its Potential Effect on Airline Operations, 41
J. AIR L. & COM. 815 (1975).
1"9Two examples of such modern arguments are: 1) that deregulation would
threaten the attraction of investment capital that is vital to the industry; 2) that
deregulation would cause a lack of flow in the interconnecting network of the
domestic air route system. See Rasenberger, Deregulation and Local Airline Serv-
ice-An Assessment of Risks, 41 J. AIR L. & CoM. 843 (1975).
